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Regulating the private 
provision of drinking 
water and sanitation 
services 
Terence R. Lee 
Andrei S. Jouravlev 
Environment and Ever since the 1970s, the governments of the region have 
Development Division, 
ECLAC keen transferring public companies and other State institu-
tions to the private sector in one manner or another. Privati-
zation has now spread to all sectors of the economy, including 
drinking water supply and sanitation services. Private sector 
involvement in the provision of these services offers poten-
tially significant efficiency gains, but it will not, in itself, 
guarantee lasting welfare improvement unless these services 
are provided in a competitive market. If not, the results will 
depend on the regulatory regime within which the industries 
operate, and the effectiveness of this regime will be deter-
mined by the ability of governments to seek and create institu-
tional and regulatory conditions that oblige suppliers to be 
efficient and responsive to the needs of their customers. This 
article focuses on the issues to be confronted in preparing a 
suitable regulatory framework for the drinking water supply 
and sanitation sector. 
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I 
Introduction 
The provision of drinking water and sanitation 
services has been marked in Latin America and the 
Caribbean by enormous deficiencies or faulty man-
agement on the part of the government. This is the 
main reason for the present widespread adoption of 
measures to increase private sector participation. 
Such participation could be expected to bring poten-
tially large efficiency gains, but it will not in itself be 
sufficient to guarantee lasting welfare improvement, 
because drinking water and sanitation services tend 
to be natural monopolies when their provision by a 
single firm results in lower costs than if they were 
provided by two or more firms. In this case, competi-
tion is either not possible or would entail inefficient 
and prohibitively costly duplication of fixed assets, 
as well as failing to take advantage of economies of 
scale. 
Unless there is a competitive market, results will 
depend on the ability of governments to find ade-
quate institutional and regulatory solutions which 
oblige suppliers to be efficient and responsive to their 
customers' needs. It is therefore important to identify 
the features which contribute to the success or failure 
of such efforts. This is particularly important because 
the regulation of private monopolies is no easy mat-
ter: "effective regulation is necessarily a complex 
Two broad modes of regulation may be distin-
guished: structure regulation, which determines 
which organizations or types of organizations can en-
gage in which activities, and conduct regulation, 
which concerns the permitted behaviour of organiza-
tions in their chosen activities (Vickers, 1991). Thus, 
conduct regulation exercises direct control over the 
objectives of the regulated firm, while structure regu-
lation exercises direct control over the structural en-
vironment of the firm, but not its behaviour (Perry, 
business, and to pretend otherwise is likely to have 
damaging long-term consequences for the industries 
concerned. Undue simplification of the initial frame-
work of regulation for privatized monopolies will.... 
very frequently lead to the emergence of much more 
serious difficulties in the longer term" (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). Furthermore, governments in the re-
gion have little experience in this field, since most 
companies in this sector used to be State-owned and 
regulatory systems for them were never developed. 
A sudden shift from public ownership and 
bureaucratic control to a regulated private mo-
nopoly completely changes the demands made on 
the management institutions of the sector and 
also requires a thorough reconsideration of the 
management policies adopted for drinking water 
and sanitation services in the past. Privatization de-
mands not only that the State should withdraw from 
many activities, but also that it should take on some 
new ones which are often of a very different nature 
and require different skills and knowledge on the part 
of public sector personnel. With regard to drinking 
water and sanitation services, experience shows that 
privatization does not simply end with the transfer of 
the assets concerned but requires continuing regula-
tory action by the public sector. 
1984). The regulation of natural monopolies will 
usually require a combination of the two. 
The nature of conduct regulation is largely 
dictated by structure regulation. In order to minimize 
the scope for government failure, there should be as 
little conduct regulation as possible. 
Regulators should seek to create a reward struc-
ture which confronts firms with strong incentives to 
adopt socially optimal choices rather than simply 
engaging in micro-management, which is not much 
II 
Regulatory system design 
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different from the management of State-owned enter-
prises; there is little merit in converting a public mo-
nopoly into a heavily-regulated private monopoly. 
The creation of such a structure involves identify-
ing the precise sources of market failures, using 
structure regulation to isolate the activities with 
which they are associated and focusing conduct 
regulation directly on the areas where market failures 
are most pronounced. If structure regulation fails to 
achieve this end, conduct regulation may be ineffec-
tive in restraining monopoly power and may induce 
productive and alíocative inefficiencies. Thus, appro-
priate regulatory design maximizes the benefits from 
removing market failures, in relation to the cost of 
government intervention, because the marginal bene-
fits of regulation decline linearly as intervention in-
creases, while the costs rise exponentially (Jones, 
1994). 
To what extent should public authorities rely on 
structure or conduct regulation? This is an empirical 
problem which necessarily depends on industry-
specific conditions, such as the scope for new entry 
and competition afforded by the underlying techno-
logical and market conditions and the degree of 
asymmetry of information. 
Ill 
Adequate information is of paramount importance for 
effective regulation, but regulators are fundamentally 
constrained by the lack of information on the utilities 
they regulate: "the problem of regulation is essen-
tially a problem of control with incomplete informa-
tion" (Laffont, 1994). The regulated company's 
management always has better information than the 
regulatory agency about both industry costs and de-
mand conditions, including the effects of the incorpo-
ration of new technologies and the most efficient means 
of operation, and also about the firm's own behaviour, 
particularly the level of its efforts to reduce costs. 
Asymmetric information allows a firm to extract rents 
from its monopoly of information and obtain supernor-
mal profits, resulting in overall welfare loss or alíoca-
tive inefficiency. 
There are sectors where market liberalization and 
restructuring can be counted on to supply the beneficial 
pressures of competition which will avoid monopolistic 
forms of conduct In others, however, there are indus-
tries, including drinking water and sanitation services, 
where potential entry and competition are limited by the 
current technology in transmission and distribution 
activities. In these industries, even if all barriers to 
entry were removed, new entrants would not materi-
alize except at the expense of productive inefficiency 
related to the prohibitively costly duplication of fixed 
assets. In industries with a high degree of natural 
monopoly, conduct regulation, rather than structural 
reform and the promotion of competition, is the ap-
propriate policy response. 
Other important factors are the nature of the infra-
structural components which define a firm as a natural 
monopoly and the speed of changes in the underlying 
technological and market conditions (Beesley and 
Littlechild, 1989). Systems of a local nature, where the 
rate of change is slow, such as drinking water and sani-
tation services, offer the most promising conditions for 
conduct regulation. If the system is of a national scale 
and the rate of change is rapid, however, such regula-
tion will be more difficult 
Asymmetric information has three major impli-
cations: 
i) the prospects of generating information for 
regulatory purposes should be an important consid-
eration in a government's decision about the nature 
of the regulatory regime and the structure of the 
industry (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). 
ii) instead of using command-and-control 
methods: i.e., instructing the firm on every aspect 
of its operation and requiring it to follow the or-
ders it is given and relying on micro-management, 
the regulatory goal should be to design incentive 
mechanisms for the regulated firm that will motivate 
it to use its superior information to maximize 
society's objectives while pursuing its own self-
interest, rather than merely extracting rents from its 
Asymmetric information 
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monopoly of information (Acton and Vogelsang, 
1989; Sappington, 1994). 
iii) regulators should have a legal right to have 
access to the inside information of the regulated firm, 
as for example through audits, and they should also 
ensure the transparency of information. Transparency 
of accounts is a very important feature of regulation 
in the United States, where a "Uniform System of 
Accounts" is used that classifies all utility accounts 
under a common system (International Energy 
Agency, 1994). 
In order to overcome asymmetric information, 
regulators must also have adequate, although suitably 
restricted, discretional powers and considerable ad-
ministrative and financial resources. 
There are several information-extracting mecha-
nisms by which a regulator can reduce the informa-
tion advantage that the regulated industry enjoys. 
One of these is the issue of licenses (franchis-
ing), or competition for the market. Where direct 
market competition is not possible within an industry, 
franchising, or competition for the right to be 
the monopolist, is another information-extracting 
mechanism. When many interested parties facing 
the same technology and production costs present 
non-collusive bids for the right to be the monopolist, 
the competition for the market among the ex-ante 
producers will hold in check the potential informa-
tional advantage of the ex-post supplier through the 
competitively determined terms of the franchise con-
tract. This approach is being increasingly used in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, examples of it be-
ing the concessions and related arrangements in Ar-
gentina and Mexico. Despite their many interesting 
features, however, franchising arrangements suffer 
from serious limitations (ECLAC, 1997; Williamson, 
1976), and the activities of the drinking water and 
sanitation sector are particularly subject to these dif-
ficulties. The most important obstacles include the 
danger that bidding for the franchise will cease to be 
competitive; problems connected with the visibility 
and transferability of investments, which may distort 
both the incentives to invest and the nature of the 
competition for franchises; and difficulties in speci-
fying and administering the contracts. 
The most promising attempt to formally address 
the problem of asymmetric information in privatized 
water supply and sanitation services seems to be 
through benchmark or yardstick competition, also 
known as competition by comparison or competition 
by example. This method promotes competition in 
cost minimization between monopolists indirectly, 
via the regulatory mechanism, by replicating com-
parisons with the performance of similar firms else-
where. The basic principle behind this proposal is to 
decouple the utility company's price structure from 
its own reported costs and hence limit its opportuni-
ties to distort its cost data. The opportunities for the 
use of benchmark competition in the drinking water 
and sanitation services industry derive from the fact 
that -as a result of the common regulatory structure 
and many common features in the operational envi-
ronment and the input and output markets of the 
service providers- when setting prices or target serv-
ice quality levels for one firm, the performance statis-
tics of other firms usually contain information signals 
concerning the underlying economic trade-offs faced 
by the given firm's management (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). It is not easy to implement bench-
mark competition, however. Regulators have found it 
difficult to incorporate it explicitly in regulatory 
frameworks (Cowan, 1993; Helm, 1994), butin spite 
of the problems it raises it is being increasingly used 
in the regulation of both the price and the quality of 
the services provided. 
The advantages of benchmark competition are 
part of the case for having horizontally separated 
companies rather than a single national company in 
natural monopoly industries (Vickers, 1995). Merg-
ers, takeovers, joint management arrangements and 
other changes in the industry structure can affect the 
regulator's ability to make effective use of bench-
mark competition. This does not rule out mergers, 
but since the loss or degradation of comparators, par-
ticularly among bigger or more efficient companies, 
adversely affects the efficiency of benchmark compe-
tition, regulators should seek to create new and im-
proved comparators and to link this with immediate 
benefits to customers, notably in the form of lower 
prices (OFWAT, 1995a). 
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IV 
Conduct regulation 
Although as a general rule the most suitable policy 
for promoting efficiency is the adoption of structural 
reforms designed to encourage competition, the spe-
cial features of drinking water and sanitation serv-
ices, especially in relatively small countries or those 
with a low level of economic development, limit the 
possibilities of such restructuring. In situations like 
these, conduct regulation becomes the most impor-
tant if not the only instrument. 
Conduct regulation is concerned with different 
aspects of the behaviour of regulated firms, such as 
their pricing policy, the quality of the products and 
services they offer, investments, etc. The aim of this 
type of regulation is to reproduce, in a monopoly 
industry, the same kind of outcome as would be 
found in a competitive situation and to create the 
same incentives as competitors would have generated 
in a competitive market. 
Conduct regulation has traditionally focussed on 
activities such as monitoring, control and auditing. It 
is very similar to the relation which exists between a 
State-owned monopoly and the ministry which over-
sees it. The more modern approach to conduct regu-
lation emphasizes economic incentives that compel 
regulated companies to operate efficiently. 
1. Price regulation 
a) Explicit price regulation 
Perhaps the most visible form of conduct regula-
tion is price regulation. There are many price regula-
tion mechanisms, but all fall somewhere along a 
continuum between the extremes of rate-of-return 
regulation (the traditional method of regulating 
public services in many countries, especially the 
United States) and price-cap regulation, which was 
applied in England and Wales in the mid-1980s. 
In recent years, traditional rate-of-return regula-
tion has been criticized for two main reasons: i) be-
cause it provides poor incentives to minimize costs 
and innovate, and ii) because it encourages firms to 
use an inefficiently high capital/labour ratio for their 
level of output: the so-called Averch-Johnson effect 
(see Averch and Johnson, 1962). A series of empiri-
cal studies of the United States drinking water and 
sanitation industry have been unable to find signifi-
cant differences between the relative efficiency of 
private utilities subject to rate-of-return regulation 
and public utilities, which would appear to confirm 
the low incentive properties of rate-of-return regula-
tion (see Feigenbaum and Teeples, 1983; Byrnes, 
Grosskopf and Hayes, 1986; Lambert, Dichev and 
Raffiee, 1993). 
Apart from the criticisms made regarding its lim-
ited capacity to provide incentives, however, rate-of-
return regulation does have some advantages. By 
providing a solid guarantee of a fair rate of return, it 
offers a type of long-term commitment which is cru-
cial for investments with a high sunk cost compo-
nent, as in the drinking water and sanitation sector 
(Laffont, 1994). It also defines a feasible procedure 
which gives investors guarantees against the risk of 
bankruptcy and provides for a strong system of 
checks and balances. Furthermore, rate-of-return 
regulation is likely to have a downward impact on 
the cost of capital (Grout, 1995). Although it may 
provide weaker incentives for cost reduction, it gen-
erally performs well in the presence of cost uncer-
tainty and asymmetric information about the 
capabilities of regulated firms, and it reduces the 
ability of the regulated firm to profit from regulatory 
ignorance or favourable cost shocks (Schmalensee, 
1989). 
Price-cap regulation attempts to avoid the prob-
lems associated with rate-of-return regulation (par-
ticularly its tendency to put upward pressure on 
costs), while at the same time limiting the scope for 
regulatory failure and reducing the burden of regula-
tion. It is argued that regulation of prices rather than 
profits provides strong incentives to improve effi-
ciency and make innovations in production technol-
ogy and the supply of services, helps to promote 
competition, and also focusses regulation precisely 
on the particular services where market failure and 
public concern are greatest, so ensuring that consum-
ers are effectively protected against monopoly abuse. 
Perhaps the most serious drawbacks of this op-
tion have to do with the difficulty of establishing 
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price adjustment factors and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the process, which can translate into higher 
capital costs and discourage investment. Even more 
serious is the fact that under this system a regulated 
firm's profits may diverge considerably from normal 
or reasonable levels, which suggests that it might be 
difficult for governments to opt for regulation based 
exclusively on price caps. Inevitably, in a monopo-
listic and highly capital-intensive industry like drink-
ing water and sanitation services, the regulatory 
authorities quickly came to the conclusion that price 
controls must be complemented with an assessment 
of capital expenditure requirements, including recog-
nition of the financial implications of capital expen-
diture for price adjustments (Jeffery, 1994). This 
blurs the difference between the price-cap approach 
and rate-of-return regulation. 
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for prefer-
ring price-cap regulation initially following privatiza-
tion, mainly because productivity gains are 
potentially larger at the time of privatization than 
subsequently, so that the improved incentive proper-
ties of price-cap regulation are particularly important 
during that period (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). In 
industries with a decentralized industrial structure, 
the reasons for preferring price-cap regulation in-
itially are reinforced by the regulator's possibility of 
generating superior information and overcoming the 
asymmetry of information through benchmark or 
yardstick competition. Furthermore, since price-cap 
regulation can effectively control the prices charged 
by dominant firms when the competitive marketplace 
controls the profits, it has been suggested that this 
form of regulation is probably most effective and 
appropriate as a transitory step on the path towards 
total deregulation and full competition (Braeutigam 
andPanzar, 1993; Schmalensee, 1995). 
Although, in their pure forms, these two mecha-
nisms may appear very different, their characteristics 
in terms of incentives to reduce costs and invest effi-
ciently are very similar in the real world, where 
either mechanism usually includes aspects of the 
other, with the result that their strong points and 
weaknesses tend to be very similar. For instance, 
regulatory lags and automatic price adjustments rein-
force the incentives under rate-of-return regulation 
and cause it to more closely resemble price-cap regu-
lation, while the need to guarantee private investors a 
reasonable rate of return on their capital brings price-
cap regulation closer to rate-of-return regulation and 
introduces the same flaws. What matters is not what 
the system is called, but rather such factors as the 
length of the regulatory lag and the expectations that 
the system generates among investors as to how and 
on what basis prices are to be readjusted (Jones, 
1994). 
The tariff-setting process currently used in Chile 
for drinking water supply and sanitation services is a 
good example of a process incorporating aspects of 
several different approaches. 
First, rates are determined on the basis of a simu-
lation of a "model firm", which is defined as a firm 
whose aim is to provide drinking water and sanitation 
services efficiently, within the prevailing regulatory 
framework, taking into account the geographical, 
demographic and technological constraints under 
which the firm must operate. This represents a form 
of benchmark competition, since the costs considered 
in the pricing process are those which the model firm 
would incur rather than those of its real-world coun-
terpart, and this, at least in theory, prevents the insti-
tutionalization of inefficiencies and encourages 
regulated firms to improve productivity. The draw-
back of this approach arises out of the basic problem 
of asymmetric information: if the regulatory agency 
uses the actual costs of the real-world firm, it vali-
dates any of the firm's possible inefficiencies and 
gives it an incentive to manipulate the information it 
provides to the regulator. Accordingly, the regulator 
will be obliged to use other sources of information 
which are not perfect either. 
Second, maximum rates are fixed for a period 
of five years. In order to make this relatively long 
regulatory lag feasible, rates are indexed in order 
to maintain their real value. These characteristics 
introduce some features of price-cap regulation 
into the set-up, since regulated firms stand to 
benefit from any cost-cutting they implement be-
fore the next periodic review. 
Third, the system incorporates some elements 
of rate-of-return regulation, since the rates are cal-
culated in such a way as to generate a return on 
assets of not less than 7%. Moreover, if before the 
next periodic review it is shown that the basic as-
sumptions used for pricing have changed signifi-
cantly, then the rate-setting formulas may be 
modified by mutual consent of the regulator and 
the firm in question. 
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b) Implicit regulation of prices or other aspects 
of conduct 
Commercial code regulation, also known as 
"potential" or "implicit" regulation or "regulation-by 
threat", does not require a sector-specific regulatory 
framework. Firms operate freely without specific 
regulation, but regulators monitor and evaluate their 
performance on the basis of principles established by 
competition or anti-trust legislation in general; fur-
thermore, there is a credible threat of regulatory 
intervention if firms engage in anti-competitive be-
haviour, if prices rise too much or if quality becomes 
compromised or customers are not reasonably satis-
fied. 
Studies of the behaviour of firms threatened with 
regulation (Glazer and McMillan, 1992) suggest that: 
i) Their behaviour is determined by the marginal 
effect of changes in price on the probability of regu-
lation; 
ii) An unregulated monopoly will consider the 
effect of its pricing policy on the probability of regu-
lation; 
iii) Because under the threat of regulation a mo-
nopoly lowers its prices to prevent regulation, the 
actual imposition of regulation may have little effect 
on its prices or expected profits; and 
iv) Firms may alter their prices more in response 
to changes in the perceived probability or strictness 
of regulation than its actual imposition. 
Commercial code regulation is relatively simple 
to implement, it is very inexpensive, and it provides 
a means to institute regulation gradually: all factors 
which are particularly important in countries with lit-
tle experience in formal regulation. It is particularly 
suitable where the cost of errors is low and as a tem-
porary measure to protect consumers against monop-
oly power until competition arrives. On the other 
hand, the rational fear that some future government 
will impose strict price regulation will force the firm 
not to increase its profits excessively, which it can 
achieve by keeping prices low but also by not work-
ing too hard and not pursuing every opportunity to 
reduce costs (Jones, 1994). 
2. Service quality regulation 
a) Various means of regulating service quality 
A reduction in product quality or service stand-
ards is equivalent to an increase in price. Without 
adequate regulation of the quality of service pro-
vided, price regulation may be rendered ineffective: 
"buyers can be exploited just as effectively by giving 
them poor or unsafe service as by charging them 
excessive prices" (Kahn, 1988). 
At the present time, competition in the basic 
transport and distribution services of drinking water 
and sanitation utilities, as well as the possibility of 
shifting demand, are very limited or non-existent in 
most cases. In addition, markets for water-related 
services are typically characterized by informational 
asymmetries between suppliers and consumers, and 
the suppliers of the services usually operate as mo-
nopolies. For these reasons, it is very unlikely that 
price control alone can give firms which are seeking 
to maximize their profits incentives to adopt socially 
optimal quality options (Shapiro, 1983; Leland, 
1979; Spence, 1975). There is therefore a strong case 
for supplementing price regulation with the regula-
tion of service quality. 
The most common methods of quality regulation 
include the following (Rovizzi and Thompson, 
1995): 
i) The publication and dissemination of informa-
tion on service quality is a simple and inexpensive 
way to put public pressure on any company provid-
ing substandard service and may also encourage new 
competitors to enter the market, but it provides few 
incentives to improve quality. 
ii) Civil liability-based schemes and the like 
have significant advantages: they can give private 
firms strong incentives to improve quality, their su-
pervision and enforcement are decentralized, they are 
flexible because they allow firms to make up for 
changes in the quality of service by increasing their 
costs, and customers receive compensation for poor 
service. They can result in high transaction costs, 
however, and they are more appropriate when quality 
failures can be easily verified. They would seem par-
ticularly appropriate for supply interruptions, ration-
ing and similar problems. Because they are costly 
and difficult to implement, civil liability schemes are 
more suited to bulk consumers. 
iii) Customer compensation schemes or guaran-
teed standards of performance, in contrast, are usu-
ally more appropriate for the majority of normal 
customers, especially when the quality faults are eas-
ily observable. They involve the setting of standards 
of service backed by a system of financial penalties 
payable in the event of non-compliance either to the 
government or, preferably, directly to the affected 
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customers. In England and Wales, for example, the 
Guaranteed Standards Scheme provides for fixed 
payments to be made when the company fails to meet 
certain guaranteed service standards (OFWAT, 1995b). 
This scheme currently provides for a flat-rate pay-
ment of £10 (about US$15) in respect of each failure 
to meet the guaranteed standard, except for sewer 
flooding, where the payment is a refund of the cus-
tomer's annual sanitation charge. Payments for some 
service failures are made automatically: if they are 
not made within ten working days of the failure, the 
customer is entitled to an additional payment. For 
other failures, claims must be made in writing by the 
customer. 
iv) In order to be more effective, minimum qual-
ity of service standards should be backed by explicit 
legal sanctions, such as fines or license amendment 
or revocation, or by an implicit threat to revise the 
regulated price or to impose enforceable quality of 
service standards, and in order to be more efficient, 
standards should be set with reference to the benefits 
of regulation and its costs. They are appropriate for 
situations where there are informational asymmetries 
between suppliers and customers and where small 
changes in quality can give rise to serious damage 
(Rovizzi and Thompson, 1995). 
v) Finally, there is the possibility of incorporat-
ing a measure of service quality explicitly in the 
price-control formula or taking it into account im-
plicitly at the regulatory review. This mechanism 
may include action to reduce prices, profits or reve-
nues when a firm fails to meet quality standards or 
the initiation of a regulatory review in the event of 
service quality falling below some preset levels. A 
well-implemented mechanism of this kind would 
mimic the incentives existing in competitive markets, 
but it involves a heavy informational burden. In any 
case, the pricing process should take into account the 
quality-related aspects of the regulated products and 
services, and the regulator should therefore monitor 
the regulated firm to ensure that it meets the quality 
standards specified in its tariffs. 
b) The common agency problem 
When a firm faces several different regulators 
for quality of service, pollution and other environ-
mental aspects, and prices, whose preferences in re-
spect of the various possible actions often conflict 
with each other, what is generally referred to as the 
common agency problem can arise. This can lead to 
tensions between the regulators and create the danger 
of inefficient outcomes (Baron, 1985 and 1989). 
This potential for inefficiency underlines the 
need for closer cooperation between the regulatory 
agencies, for institutional procedures that guarantee 
collective decision-making, for the responsibilities 
of regulatory agencies to be compatible, and for an 
explicit duty to be imposed on the environmental 
regulator to balance costs against benefits, as long as 
legal obligations are not compromised (Cowan, 
1993). In the privatized water industry in England 
and Wales, the Office of Water Services (OFWAT), as 
economic regulator, does not decide on environ-
mental policies but it ensures that decision-makers 
have all the necessary facts, strives to ensure that 
costing data are available and that sufficient solu-
tions have been considered, and is concerned that 
companies should be able to plan their investment 
programmes in a reasonably stable regulatory envi-
ronment (Booker, 1994). It impresses on the quality-
regulating agencies the importance of carrying out 
adequate economic analysis before they adopt more 
stringent standards. 
3. Regulation of quantity 
Many water-related goods and services form a small 
but indispensable part of the total cost of the wide 
range of products in which they are used and meet 
needs that consumers cannot readily forego. As a 
consequence, the losses from service failure can be 
very large in financial, social and political terms, 
relative to the basic cost of provision of the service. 
For this reason, public service utilities are usually 
subject to universal service obligations, that is to say, 
obligations to serve all those who live within their 
area, apply for service, and are willing and able to 
pay for it. Without such an obligation, utilities will 
not have a motivation to provide service when the 
costs of satisfying demand temporarily increase. For 
public utility industries, this requirement sometimes 
means that they must make capital investments in 
unprofitable areas or must maintain an unprofitable 
type of service, but more commonly it means that 
utilities must expand capacity ahead of demand 
growth (Phillips, 1993). 
The universal service obligation means that in 
the case of an essential public service the public sec-
tor can never wholly abdicate its responsibilities for 
the operation of that service, as it can in some other 
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industries, without placing the public at risk. Given 
that ihe operator of last resort will always be the 
public sector, governments should probably consider 
either regulating privatized water-related utilities 
more comprehensively or foregoing more compre-
hensive regulation but charging the privatized firm a 
risk premium for "public insurance" to cover the con-
tingent costs of public sector intervention should the 
firm enter into a critical operating condition (Devlin, 
1993). An alternative, albeit less attractive, would 
be for the public sector to retain the residual means 
of providing essential services should the private 
sector fail to perform its functions. 
4. Regulating investment 
Many of the benefits of private sector participation in 
the drinking water supply and sanitation industry re-
sult from the fact that such participation protects nec-
essary but politically dispensable investments from 
unfavourable budgetary pressures. It also provides a 
means of tapping the greater pool of private capital to 
help finance them. The direct object of regulation is 
usually pricing policy, but the effect of regulation on 
social welfare depends critically on the investment 
behaviour that price regulation induces in regulated 
firms (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Given the nature 
and technological characteristics of the water supply 
and sanitation sector, the advantages of private par-
ticipation are likely to be small unless there is private 
participation in investment. 
An adequate supply of private finance will only 
be forthcoming if investors are confident that their 
investment will not disappear through direct expro-
priation or through a series of small regulatory ac-
tions that are tantamount to a de facto expropriation, 
and that they will obtain a rate of return on the capi-
tal invested which is commensurate with the risk they 
take. The problem of regulatory commitment "arises 
from a fundamental asymmetry: the regulated price is 
flexible but the regulated firm's capital stock is not" 
(Besanko and Spulber, 1992). Since the economic 
life of many of the components of drinking water 
supply and sanitation infrastructure is extremely long 
and moreover these structures cannot be relocated to 
other areas or given alternative uses, the profitability 
of investment depends not so much on the initial 
regulatory framework as it does on the decisions sub-
sequently taken by the regulator after the investment 
or privatization has been carried out. 
Potential investors need government commit-
ment to respect in the long term their property rights, 
the rules and regulations governing tariffs, entry con-
ditions, and expansion plans. It is essential, therefore, 
to develop a stable regulatory environment to encour-
age and maintain private investment in water-related 
services. Unless there is such a stable environment, 
the rational fear of ex post opportunism by govern-
ments will deter efficient investment in sunk cost 
assets. The only secure route to private sector confi-
dence is a history of rational government committed 
to policies encouraging private investment in public 
services. These considerations underline the impor-
tance of ensuring transparent and stable regulatory 
standards which will uphold the State's commitment 
to recognize the need for a long-term level of profit-
ability acceptable to the private investor. In addition, 
the regulatory framework should be flexible enough 
to adapt to changes in markets, as well as in the 
economic, institutional, social and technological 
spheres. 
One effect of privatization will be to signifi-
cantly increase the discount rate applied to invest-
ment projects, as the discount factors used by 
governments are usually low. This means that priva-
tization can affect the choice of technology. If a gov-
ernment decides to use subsidies to encourage the 
private sector to follow a specific investment path, 
attention should be paid to the need to ensure that 
any subsidies are channeled to the most efficient 
companies and do not affect the play of the market* 
forces too much. 
When prices are regulated, regulatory agencies 
must carefully monitor the capital and maintenance 
spending of the regulated firms to ensure that they 
make the investments allowed for in the price limits 
on time and achieve the expansion, quality and other 
targets for which the investments had been proposed. 
The need for close monitoring is underlined by the 
capital-intensive nature of most drinking water sup-
ply and sanitation utilities, which provides scope for 
evading the constraints imposed by price regulation, 
by reorganizing their investment profile to enhance 
short-term financial performance at the possible 
expense of longer-term efficiency and prospects 
(Bishop and Kay, 1989). 
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V 
Structure regulation 
There may be different reasons for implementing 
structural reforms, the most important being: 
i) In the case of potentially competitive indus-
tries, to encourage competition, not for competition's 
sake but as a means of achieving cost effectiveness or 
eliminating or reducing the need for conduct regula-
tion; and 
ii) In the case of industries such as drinking 
water and sanitation, where competition is not possi-
ble for technological reasons, to improve access to 
information and facilitate conduct regulation. 
When considering structural reforms, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that they are by no means a 
panacea. Attempts to separate closely interdependent 
activities can impose high costs on the sector, includ-
ing the loss of economies of scale and scope, the cost 
of the system coordination machinery, the costs of 
restructuring the sector, and the possible loss of some 
internalization of externalities. Such costs need to be 
carefully weighed against the potential benefits of 
cost-minimizing behaviour in a situation of competi-
tive pressure. If these factors are significant, there 
might be justification for continuing with an inte-
grated monopoly. 
1. Horizontal restructuring 
Horizontal restructuring means integrating or sepa-
rating identical production processes on a territorial 
basis or by service categories. A typical example of 
horizontal separation is the subdivision of national 
drinking water supply and sanitation companies into 
regional or municipal units. 
In some cases -for example, when the size of the 
market far exceeds the optimum scale of production 
and transport costs are insignificant compared with 
those of production- horizontal separation can create 
direct competition. This model has been applied in 
various countries in the electricity sector, but it is not 
directly applicable to the drinking water supply and 
sanitation sector, because there are generally no na-
tional or regional networks. In some cases, however, 
it is possible to create competition between regional 
enterprises for big industrial or commercial clients or 
for the right to supply clients located on the edges of 
the companies' service areas. 
Perhaps the main advantage of horizontal sepa-
ration, even when it leads to local monopolies (unless 
there is no correlation in the cost conditions among 
them) is that it enables regulators to have access to 
information from a group of independent providers 
of comparable services. This provides a basis for 
comparisons between firms which are useful for set-
ting incentives based on relative performance and 
hence creating opportunities for the application of 
more effective regulatory incentive structures based 
on comparable yardsticks or benchmarks. In addition, 
the existence of several companies opens up the in-
dustry to competition between them in the capital 
market. 
Horizontal separation can also mean, however, 
that regulators are faced with the prospect of regulat-
ing and monitoring a considerable number of firms, 
which may cause serious administrative problems. 
2. Vertical restructuring 
Vertical restructuring concerns the integration or 
separation of the different processes needed to make 
the final product or service available to the con-
sumer. A typical example of vertical separation is the 
division of a State-owned electric power utility into 
separate generating, transmission and distribution 
companies. 
Although vertical integration in competitive 
markets often increases efficiency and social well-
being, the vertical integration of monopoly firms can 
be a source of concern for regulators for various rea-
sons: 
i) Vertical integration can allow a natural mo-
nopoly to extend its monopoly power to non-
regulated upstream and downstream markets by 
discriminating in its own favour or in favour of affili-
ated firms, increasing barriers to entry, and foreclos-
ing competitors by such means as prohibitive 
network access charges or discrimination in other 
aspects of interconnection, and 
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ii) Vertical integration usually worsens the asym-
metry of information between regulators and firms 
and impairs the quality of the information available 
to the regulator, thus hindering effective conduct 
regulation and providing opportunities for circum-
vention. 
These considerations suggest that the regulator 
should try to identify the component or components of 
water resource infrastructure which establish a utility as a 
natural monopoly and attempt as far as possible to isolate 
those activities that may be described as an intrinsic natu-
ral monopoly from other activities or production proc-
esses that cannot be described as such. This separation 
seeks to prevent companies that integrate various produc-
tion segments from using one of these to obtain undue 
advantages from others or from concealing inefficiencies 
by transferring profits earned elsewhere to them 
So far, vertical reforms of this type have been 
applied more extensively in the electricity sector, but 
they are not directly applicable to the drinking water 
supply and sanitation sector, where the scope for 
increasing competition through vertical structural 
reforms is extremely limited if not non-existent, be-
cause of the strength of the natural monopoly condi-
tions deriving from the established local networks of 
water mains and sewers. The obstacles are the need 
for extremely tight coordination between the services, 
due to the interrelated demand, the high costs of 
service delivery in relation to the costs of water pro-
duction or wastewater treatment, and the fact that the 
experience gained and the equipment used in one ac-
tivity is useful in the other. 
3. Diversification of regulated firms 
The diversification of any firm has many advantages, 
since it makes it possible to spread risks, compensate 
for fluctuations in demand, make better use of the 
firm's capacity, and secure other benefits which can 
be reflected in lower costs and better service. 
In spite of its potential benefits, however, the 
diversification of regulated firms can be a source of 
concern for regulators for several reasons (Arm-
strong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994): 
i) Difficulties in the unregulated activity could 
negatively affect the regulated firm's ability to raise 
capital and operate its core business; 
ii) Diversification of a firm makes estimation of 
the cost of capital more difficult, and if the firm di-
versifies into a riskier business this might raise that 
cost; 
iii) The operation of the non-core business might 
consume excessive amounts of the time and re-
sources of the regulated firm's management. 
Diversification of a regulated firm can also 
worsen the asymmetry of information between the 
regulator and the firm and reduce the regulator's 
ability to implement benchmark competition, by re-
ducing the number of available comparators. It also 
allows scope for cross-subsidization through transfer 
pricing in intra-company transactions. 
For these reasons, the authorities should be alert 
to the impact of the diversification of regulated firms, 
although it would not be appropriate to prohibit di-
versification entirely, since it can give economies of 
scale and scope and open up the possibility of reduc-
ing costs. An important question is how to structure 
the regulatory system to take advantage of the posi-
tive aspects of diversification while avoiding its un-
desirable effects. The main point is to ensure 
transparency of transactions between regulated and 
unregulated activities, to avoid cross-subsidies, and 
to guarantee access by the regulator to the informa-
tion he needs to fulfill his objectives. 
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VI 
Regulating public utilities in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
the present situation 
Almost all the Latin American and Caribbean gov-
ernments have adopted policies to increase private 
sector participation in the provision of drinking water 
supply and sanitation services. The actual nature of 
these policies varies greatly from one country to an-
other. Only a few of them have opted to completely 
transfer the administration of these services to the 
private sector, generally in the form of concessions, 
as in Argentina and Bolivia. Elsewhere, as in Chile 
and Venezuela, decentralization and regulation 
within the public sector has been the policy adopted, 
with private sector participation limited to contrac-
tual service arrangements of a more technical nature. 
As regards regulatory policy, however, the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have two clear 
priorities: the development of effective regulatory ca-
pacity and the establishment of the independence of 
regulatory authorities, which should be free of direct 
political interference. At the same time, it is neces-
sary for those defining regulatory policy to be abso-
lutely clear as to what the real objectives of such 
policy must be. 
It is not easy to develop a regulatory system, and 
it has been necessary to formulate systems which can 
rapidly incorporate the lessons of experience, since it 
is impossible to predict all problems from the start. 
The main obstacles are lack of experience and a rela-
tively steep learning curve. It is for this reason that 
the functions of the regulator must be clearly defined 
and strictly limited to the absolutely necessary. In 
general, this is why price regulation is the preferred 
basic approach, leaving other decisions to the manag-
ers of the utilities. Regulation of service quality has 
its own intrinsic importance, however. 
Adequate information is of paramount impor-
tance for effective regulation. The most promising 
path for the countries of the region to formally ad-
dress the problem of asymmetric information seems 
to be some form of benchmark competition. The ad-
vantages of benchmark competition are part of the 
case for having a horizontally separated rather than 
national structure in water supply and sanitation 
services. 
The effect of regulation on social welfare de-
pends critically on the investment behaviour that it 
induces in regulated firms. In general, there is no 
shortage of capital in the world for investment in this 
sector; on the contrary, it is perfectly possible to set a 
flow of investment in motion, as shown by the exam-
ple of the electric power sector. For this to take place, 
however, potential investors need government com-
mitment not only to respect their property rights over 
the long run but also to create a stable regulatory 
environment that will encourage and maintain private 
investment in water-related services. As already 
noted, the only secure route to private sector confi-
dence is a history of rational government committed 
to policies that encourage private investment in pub-
lic services. 
(Original: English) 
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